

America and Europe towards 2020

A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE

Does the 'West' still exist ?

SIR STEPHEN WALL, GCMG LVO



He joined the Diplomatic Service in 1968, working first in the UK Mission to the UN in New York, before returning to United Nations Department in London. In 1969, he was posted to Addis Ababa and then on to Paris, in 1972. From 1974, he worked successively in the Foreign Office News Department, London, on loan to the Prime Minister's Press Office and Assistant Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary.

From 1979 to 1983, he served in the British Embassy Washington, then as Assistant Head and then Head of European Community Department (Internal) at the FCO. From 1988 to 1991, he was Private Secretary to three successive Foreign Secretaries (Geoffrey Howe, John Major and Douglas Hurd). From 1991 to 1993, he served as Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, Mr John Major, responsible for Foreign Policy and Defence.

Stephen Wall served as British Ambassador to Portugal (1993-1995). He was the Permanent Representative to the European Union (1995-2000). From 2000-2004 he was the Head of the European Secretariat in the Cabinet Office in London and EU adviser to the Prime Minister, Tony Blair. From June 2004 – June 2005 he was Principal Adviser to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Westminster, Cardinal Cormac Murphy-O'Connor.

Europe without America?

In 1981, the United States celebrated the bicentenary of the Battle of Yorktown, the battle in which the English Admiral, Lord Cornwallis, lost decisively to the rebel forces and, along with the battle, lost the American War of Independence.

President Reagan stood on the podium, along with the leader of the country which shared so many American values, traditions and historical associations and paid tribute to the importance, two hundred years on, of that relationship. Reagan's distinguished guest was generous in his reply. As we celebrate the ties which bind us, he said, let us not forget that in a more recent conflict, in 1940, it was another country that stood alone in the battle for freedom and we owe that country a debt of gratitude too. The country the speaker was referring to was the United Kingdom. The speaker was President Francois Mitterrand.

It is hard to imagine that event being replicated today, hard to imagine the President of the United States sharing such a platform with the President of France and hard to imagine the President of France speaking in such terms. *Autres temps, autres moeurs*. It is an illustration of the up-and-down nature of the relationship between the United States and Europe, or rather the European powers.

America's Self Interest

When Donald Rumsfeld spoke disparagingly about old versus new Europe, he sent a shockwave across the European continent.¹ That too was an illustration: of the fact that 'Europe' only exists for the United States where it has suited it and of the fact that 'Europe' only exists for the countries that make up the European Union when it suits *them*.

Robert Kagan, in his book *Dangerous Nation*² paints a vivid portrait of France, first as ally and then as opponent, of the new United States. He portrays England too, first as opponent and then as ally. The French Revolution that drew inspiration from America became the French Revolution that shocked America. The restored French monarchy represented all that America most distrusted whilst the much hated

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British monarchy, or at least the system of government it personified, began to look like the embodiment of a liberal ideal which America shared. Kagan argues cogently that the policy enunciated by George Washington in his farewell speech was not an immutable doctrine of non-involvement in external entanglements at any time or at any price but an immutable doctrine of American national self-interest. Where that self-interest lay when England started campaigning vigorously for the world-wide abolition of slavery depended on whether you lived to the north or south of the Mason Dixon line. Just as where that self-interest lay when Europe was falling into the hands of tyranny in 1940 depended on whether you were President Roosevelt or Vice President Wallace, one an interventionist, the other a pacifist for equal but opposite reasons of perceived national interest.

Without the Battle of Britain and the invasion of Russia, Hitler might not have been stopped. Without Pearl Harbour he might not have been defeated. A Fascist United States under President Lindbergh, cooperating with Nazi Germany, as portrayed by Philip Roth in *The Plot Against America*³ is uncomfortably plausible. So is the portrayal of a Nazi-occupied Britain, collaborators and all, in Len Deighton's popular novel *SS-GB*.⁴

Common Interests?

Events dear boy, events" are, as Harold Macmillan famously said, the main ingredient of political life. Neither the events, nor the personalities who will create them or react to them, are predictable. One of the questions for this essay is how far the shared values of which Americans and Europeans still routinely speak exist as a genuine determinant of common external policy interests, or how far "shared values" are merely a way of convincing ourselves of the permanence of what may in reality be only temporary shared interests, or may even be no more than a description of what were, rather than are, common interests.

The value of tolerance is one example. Kagan argued in *Paradise and Power*⁵ that tolerance was another name for weakness. He has a point. If, for example, a European country had suffered a terrorist attack on the scale of 9/11 it would, I believe, never have occurred to that government, or the governments of Europe, to launch a retaliatory attack on Afghanistan, let alone Iraq. Our response would have been proportionate to our capacity to respond. Europeans who do not, on

the whole, carry handguns exercise their road rage by punching each other on the nose. In America, the protagonists, who do have handguns, shoot each other. After 9/11, the United States had the capacity to turn its anger outwards and did so, rationally in the case of Afghanistan and with international approval and support; less rationally, and without international approval and support, in the case of Iraq.

I doubt if this represents a qualitative, as opposed to a quantitative, difference between the United States and Europe or, at any rate, between the United States and those countries such as Britain and France which have a history of military engagement and which remain nuclear powers. For those countries of Europe with a tradition of neutrality the difference may be a more fundamental and enduring one.

Insofar as there is a tension between a tolerant (meaning for some in America, weak) Europe and a strong, militarily proactive United States that tension was perforce held in check for the duration of the Cold War. The tension manifested itself in strenuous European opposition to the neutron bomb and the deployment of Pershing missiles in Europe. But the United States was ineluctably committed to the defence of Europe because the US and Europe shared a common enemy in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's ability to overwhelm European conventional forces would have set off the tripwire of a battlefield nuclear response which, in turn, could have triggered an intercontinental missile strike.

Europe's backyard was America's frontline whether the United States wanted it or not. The Europeans could therefore moan about it but were obliged to accept, in their own self-interest, that there was one partner in NATO much more equal than all the others, namely the United States. But it was more than an alliance of extreme convenience. For most, though not all, of Western public opinion there was no question of moral equivalence between the USSR and the United States. Stalin, Berlin and Cuba saw to that. But, even so, the relationship was tested by Vietnam which was perhaps one of those instances, like Iraq, where the shared values of governments in support of war were pitted against the shared values of peoples in opposition to it. Certainly, when it came to Iraq, the governments of Europe may have been split down the middle in being for or against the war but the overwhelming majority of European public opinion was against it. Iraq, like Vietnam, has seriously undermined European faith in the underlying morality of US policy.

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The Questions of Capacity and Proportionality

Proportionality, which may be another version of Kagan's "weakness"⁶ led people to accept that an American ability to kill 20 million Russians in a nuclear strike was a necessary response to the Russian ability to do the same. Many of the same people did not accept that the American involvement in Vietnam was proportionate, even if they accepted the domino theory in the first place.

Proportionality takes different forms. In Vietnam, for many Europeans the disproportion was between the war between North and South Vietnam on the one hand and the scale of the US military response on the other. In the United States, the issue of proportionality was between the importance of US objectives on the one hand and the growing loss of the lives of young Americans on the other. The same is increasingly true for Iraq.

For Jim Baker, as US Secretary of State, America's non-involvement in Bosnia was because America did not "have a dog in this fight".⁷ Europe *did* have a dog in the fight, the security of the European continent. But most European governments believed that the price to be paid for military inaction was less than the price to be paid in the lives of their citizens through military engagement. Napoleon's dictum that the Balkans were not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier still held sway.

By contrast, the military strikes against Milosevic in Kosovo were largely accepted by European public opinion because they (just) passed both tests of proportionality. Even though, as in Iraq, the military action had no specific UN cover it was accepted because Kosovo, as part of Europe, was seen as an EU responsibility. The EU's perceived failure to live up to its obligations in Bosnia made European leaders all the more determined not to fail again in Kosovo. Had Milosevic not collapsed when he did, then the loss of yet more civilian lives and the possibility of military action on the ground might well have swung an already anxious public opinion into opposition to further engagement. The litmus test of both public support and international legitimacy is, unsurprisingly, success.

By contrast again, in 2003 Iraq failed the proportionality test in terms of pain versus gain and, for Europeans, the fact that they were not persuaded of the case for the war in political, defence or humanitarian

terms increased the unacceptability for them of the failure to secure legal cover for the action.

“Shock and awe”, the doctrine of disproportionate response, has been discredited in Iraq and seems likely to be discredited even more when the decision to send a further 20,000 troops fails to halt the Iraqi civil war. If the military action in Iraq can be seen as a modern version of the domino theory, then the American public seems less and less persuaded of its validity: they do not see the solution to the problems of international terrorism as being solvable by American military invasion. As a result, selective, targeted, airborne attacks seem more likely than ground engagements as a future response to threats to Western interests, but Europe and the United States may well be divided in their assessment of the risks and consequences of such action.

What Price - Regime Change?

A crucial question for whether the United States and Europe grow apart is whether, despite the experience of Iraq, the United States remains in favour of regime change. The next British Prime Minister is more likely than Tony Blair to share the European dislike of regime change, given its failure to work in Iraq.

Tony Blair has argued in speeches and in an article in *Foreign Affairs (A Battle for Global Values)* that the “crucial point” about the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq is:

“...that they were not just about changing regimes but about changing the value systems governing the nations concerned. The banner was not actually ‘regime change’; it was ‘values change’. That is why I have said that what has been done, by intervening in this way, may be even more momentous than was appreciated at the time.”⁸

Part of the problem with this argument is that the two countries whose values systems were (at least in theory) changed were, or were thought to be, relatively soft targets. The United States is not about to intervene to change the values systems of Pakistan, a military regime with unauthorised nuclear weapons or of Saudi Arabia which spawned some of the nastier terrorists at large in the world. For reasons of self interest and the total impracticality of the use of force the United States prefers

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to embrace rather than demonise both countries. It is the self-serving and inconsistent nature of the rationale behind the invasion of Iraq that alienates Europeans (most Britons, apart from Blair, included) along with the suspicion that a real and serious terrorist threat is being used to justify action which is seen, not just as a disproportionate response, but as an inappropriate response.

Iran is the prime current instance where the Bush/Blair doctrine is likely to be tested. A US or Israeli air strike, or series of strikes, on Iran would not require European participation, though they might need logistical support as was the case for America's attack on Libya in 1980. The precise timing of an attack would be a secret but its imminence would not because of the prior build-up of diplomatic pressure and international action in search of a solution.

Europeans, including post-Blair Britain, are likely to be more preoccupied than Americans by what Sir Jeremy Greenstock called in a recent BBC radio interview "the consequences of the consequences".⁹ For example, the destruction of Iranian nuclear facilities would shield Israel from the immediate threat of nuclear attack but would also increase the long-term threat to Israel's security from sustained terrorist assaults. More gravely, if attacks had to be sustained on a number of Iranian sites over a period of some nights, the risk of an Iranian military response directed against Israel would also be that much greater. In the short term, Europeans would be more preoccupied than Americans by the likely threat to oil supplies. For the longer term, Europeans would be more concerned about the effects on peace in the region.

As a result, Europeans are likely to be more disposed to want to go the last mile for a peaceful resolution and to press for action limited to that which the UN Security Council will support. They will be even more opposed to regime change in general, and in the specific case of Iran, than in the past.

How far this divergence became a breach would depend on the consequences of American, or American-backed Israeli, military action against Iran. In the short term, most European governments would at the least want to distance themselves from the action (though the British government would be reluctant to do so vocally). If the longer term results were as dire as most European governments will fear then there would be a greater prospect than ever before that Europe would try to

take a lead, regardless of the United States, in forging an independent Middle East strategy. How far that exacerbated an already severe breach in transatlantic relations would depend on whether American public opinion turned against what had been done to Iran. In either case, it is hard to see Europe having the political influence over Israel that the United States has, at least in theory. It is almost as hard to see Europe trying to exert leverage on Israel by applying the pressure of its economic relationship. Israel commands much less popular support in Europe than in the United States but that support is nonetheless not negligible and if democratic Israel were thought to be seriously threatened by non democratic Arab states pro Israel public sympathy would increase. It is hard to see that essential dynamic changing in the next two decades. In other words, Europeans could pursue an independent policy towards the Middle East but the chances of them helping achieve a peace settlement without the active leadership of the United States look remote.

Security Threats through to 2020

In the case of Iran, fear of a nuclear-armed, aggressive dictatorship is the main driver of Western policy. While the analysis is shared across the Atlantic, the ultimate choice of response may not be. Will the same be true for the other challenges we will face over the next twenty years?

Over the period, the principal sources of tension within the West, as well as between the West and others, will come from:

- continued international terrorism, conceivably escalating to the use of nuclear weapons in some form;
- the interaction of so-called rogue states with international terrorism;
- instability in the Middle East caused by the Israel-Palestine question;
- the actions of Iran and the US response;
- instability in countries such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia fuelled by the pressures of a growing, young, population;

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- competition for access to energy supplies on the one hand and the abuse of power by energy suppliers on the other. The first is already a source of tension with China, the second of tension with Russia;
- the consequences of climate change and the lack of a transatlantic, let alone a global, consensus for dealing with them;
- the impact of demographic changes, which may exacerbate Europe's relative economic weakness and will, self-evidently, fuel migratory pressures;
- Pandemic disease.

One, or a combination of these, could lead to conflict. There are neo-realists who believe that a military confrontation between the United States and China is inevitable. Energy dependence is leading China to seek privileged relationships with controversial countries such as Somalia and Zimbabwe. The quest for energy security will cause more widespread tension as countries compete for privileged relationships with producers. There will be competition between the industrial powers and therefore greater scope for friction as India and China, in particular, compete for their share of energy resources and as they develop the political relationships to help deliver security of supply. How dangerous these tensions become depends upon many of the other factors in the equation. Those include the role of China as a country which thwarts or assists the management of the 'world order' in the UN Security Council. Mark Leonard has argued in a recent paper for the Centre for European Reform (*Divided World: The Struggle for Primacy in 2020*)¹⁰ that Russia and China will use their positions as permanent members of the UN Security Council to contain the United States and to protect themselves from western interference. If China does seek, in cooperation with Russia, to establish a sphere of influence which, by providing a comfort zone for dubious governments and thwarting effective action in the UN Security Council, threatens American interests then events may turn out as the neo realists suggest. But there seems to me to be nothing inevitable about such a clash which depends as much upon how the United States perceives its interests as upon the actions of China. The biggest unknown is what will happen within China itself.

In no foreseeable circumstances is Europe likely to see the way through these difficulties as lying in anything but the deployment of soft power.

If a neo-realist agenda of increasingly hawkish confrontation with China (of which Taiwan could yet be a trigger) became staple fare in the United States, it would set alarm bells ringing in Europe.

By 2030, Europe will be dependent on imports for 90% of its oil needs and 65% of its gas needs.¹¹ Unless the European Union can agree in the near future on a coherent energy policy, including on unbundling, regulation, energy choices and external energy policy its ability to frame coherent policies for its relationship with Russia will be constrained by its dependency. That dependency has already contributed significantly to the inability of the European Union to formulate a coherent policy towards the government of President Putin as individual European leaders have beaten a sycophantic path to his door. The United States will be less constrained but also less interested unless Russia's behaviour becomes threatening. Given Russia's dependence on exports for income and the disorganised state of its energy industry its capacity for sustained blackmail of the West is likely to be limited over the period but the impact of Russian bullying on its neighbours will be a source of anxiety and destabilisation. It is likely to make Ukraine, for example, even keener than it is now to join the European Union. The reluctance of some EU member states to see Ukraine join will be a source of friction with the United States which, not having to bear the costs, political and economic, is keener on enlargement than many Europeans. If that European reluctance was reinforced by fear of antagonising a bearish Russia, American irritation would be that much greater.

Convergence and Global Balance

The most catastrophic consequences of climate change will probably not be visited on us in the next twenty years but the evidence of inevitable catastrophe unless radical action is taken seems likely to become even more incontrovertible. If so, the perception gap between America and Europe will narrow though friction will persist as Europe remains more convinced that the cost of preventive action needs to be faced and met. It is likely that Europe will remain in the vanguard but, if the mood in the United States changed, and the United States put even more resource into technological research, the potential commercial gain could turn the United States from laggard into leader. If that happened the United States might in turn raise the stakes of climate change as a marker in its relationship with countries such as China.

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It seems likely that, barring a new 9/11 that provoked a massive US military response, European and American views on the management of some kind of world order are likely to converge in the post-Bush era. Lessons have been learned painfully from Iraq about the limitations of external intervention to deliver a result which matches up to the objective.

David Owen, the British Foreign Secretary at the time of the fall of the Shah of Iran, later regretted that Western powers had not intervened more to prevent the Shah's overthrow and, with it the loss of a country whose political and economic policies were oriented towards the West.¹² A similar dilemma may well present itself in other countries, for example in Saudi Arabia. The impact of a revolution in Saudi Arabia on energy supplies and on terrorist activity would be the key drivers of the Western response. A measured response, which secured European support, would require the United States to formulate its policy on a cool calculation of interest, rather than on its distaste for the regime and zeal for democracy, the latter not being a conspicuous commodity in modern Saudi Arabia in any event.

After Iraq, a unilateral US intervention, pre-emptive or otherwise, seems improbable and the prospects of an international coalition negligible. Taking the fall of the Shah as a model, and on the questionable assumption that the revolution there could have been forestalled, the main gain, compared with what has actually happened, would have been to avoid a regime which supports terrorism and is developing a menacing nuclear capacity. But whether trade in oil and other commodities would have been more secure is questionable given that terrorist action against the regime and the western forces in the country would have increased. Even support for terrorism elsewhere, while not on the present scale, would not have been impossible. After all, the situation would not have been unlike that in Pakistan i.e. a government anxious for a good relationship with the West but without the capacity to deliver a comprehensive anti-terrorist policy. Indeed, just as a blind eye to terrorism has been a price the Saudi regime has paid for internal stability, so the Shah would have very possibly had to pay a similar price in Iran.

The United States and Europe may both consider themselves unlucky in their present leaderships. The infatuation with Senator Barack Obama on both sides of the Atlantic is a measure, not so much of his evident

qualities as of that longing for a unifying political vision. There has never been a time in post World War II history in which Europeans have felt a greater sense of alienation from the government of the United States. It is alienation from both the politics and policies of President Bush. For Britons at least, with no tradition of a Supreme Court as the accepted ultimate guardian of a democratic constitution, the contested outcome of the Presidential election of 2000 contributed to an unwillingness to accept American presidential leadership unquestioningly. Insofar as Europeans felt, after the 2004 election, that George W. Bush embodied the sentiment of the majority of Americans that sense of alienation extended to the United States as a whole.

However, the intervening two years, and last year's congressional elections, have started to change perceptions. The faith of Europeans in the capacity of American democracy to find a middle ground of balanced policy has been partially restored, together with a popular belief that what Europeans have to do is to keep their fingers crossed until Inauguration Day 2009. That faith in the redeeming quality of democracy, despite European distrust of a particular Administration and its policies, is probably one underlying feature of the relationship which, though sorely tested, will survive over the next twenty years.

The European Union works because, in the end, each member country has confidence in the democratic institutions of the others. The EU has structures and rules to try to prevent a breakdown of that basis of trust in any of the member states. But if there were a failure of democracy in any member state then the loss of that fundamental shared value would wipe out all the other points of common interest that remained. A shared commitment to democracy, and confidence in each other's democratic structures, is likely to remain the glue in the transatlantic relationship. However far apart the United States and Europe grow on policy issues they are likely to see each other as "friends in need", something which will not be true of China or Russia. That may not prevent either Europe or the United States pursuing policies towards Russia or China which will test the transatlantic relationship to a greater extent than ever before, especially as the constraints of the Cold War no longer apply. The one thing that would prevent that happening would be the emergence of a new security threat, seen on both sides of the Atlantic as being as great as that posed by Soviet Russia.

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That apart, just as the balance of terror and Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) made the superpowers shrink from nuclear confrontation, so global economic and energy dependence make the modern risks from military intervention that much greater. Economic interdependence was seen by the founders of the European Community as the key to peace and political stability. The same should be true on a global scale but with provisos. For that principle to work on a global scale seems to me to depend on two ingredients which may continue to divide Europe and America. The economic interdependence of the EU's member states translates into political stability in part because Europe has supra national institutions which have authority over the individual member states. The nearest global equivalent is the United Nations and European support for it will remain stronger than that of the United States. But it seems unlikely that any nation or regional grouping will make the sacrifices needed to implement the Annan reforms. If that is true, the main difference between the United States and Europe will be greater European regard for the rule of international law as determined by the UN Charter (something for which the next British Prime Minister is likely to have more respect than the present one) but combined with a similar reluctance to will the means to make the UN effective even when there is agreement on the ends.

If that is so, and it fits the pattern of the last fifty years, then the United States' frustration with the United Nations and, de facto, its reluctance to be constrained by international law as determined by the UN Charter and Chapter VII action authorised by the Security Council, will also continue and there will be pressure on Europe to redefine the terms of international engagement beyond the Westphalian model. Tony Blair has sought such a model, without conspicuous success in carrying his compatriots and other Europeans with him. The recent report to Kofi Annan on UN reform also sought to redefine the basis on which international intervention could take place so that it could be proactive and preventative, not just reactive. But that proposed reform was still firmly rooted in the notion of explicit UN Security Council authorisation. That will remain a significant division between Europe and America. Europeans will be much more reluctant than Americans to participate in, let alone support, unauthorised action. However, as I have argued, the scope for such action by the United States seems likely to be limited by the failure of the Iraq policy and there may therefore be a greater transatlantic convergence in practice than in principle.

The second ingredient that is necessary to make interdependence a driver of stability is what the French commentator, Dominique Moisi, has called the success of the culture of hope over the culture of humiliation.¹³ Herein lies one of the biggest differences between the United States and Europe. Both recognise the role of poverty and deprivation as breeding grounds for disaffection, anger and terrorism. Both have significant international aid efforts, though the European one is much larger than the American. Both share the millennium development goals though the Europeans, thanks to Gordon Brown's initiative for an International Finance Facility¹⁴, have so far done more about realising them. Both recognise that there is more to today's international terrorism than an outpouring of anger rooted in deprivation.

Europe's Role

But outside Tony Blair's 10 Downing Street, there is less readiness in Europe than in the United States to believe, either in Huntington's *clash of civilisations*¹⁵ (which Tony Blair has converted into a clash *about* civilisation) or that there is an axis of evil in the sense in which President Bush conceives it. No one doubts that there are fanatics who feed on poverty and deprivation but who are driven by zealotry, which Moisi has likened to Christian zealotry in Europe in the sixteenth century. Those terrorists, and the governments that support them, may cause huge human misery but reaching an understanding about the significance of that terrorist action and the nature of the West's response will be crucial if the relationship between Europe and the United States is not to be subject to constant tensions. As I have suggested, US perceptions and analysis are still far apart from those of Europe. Events have brought both sides closer. But I doubt whether many European governments recognise the concept of rogue states as construed by President Bush and Tony Blair.

There will be continued scope for American divide-and-rule in Europe because the European Union will continue to enlarge and because, partly but not exclusively as a result, the integrationist agenda, whose high point was the Maastricht treaty, will continue to lose ground. The willingness of EU member states to extend the scope of the supra-national Community method of decision-making to the decisions which need to be taken over energy policy and climate change is in doubt. The political will which drove policy in the 1980s under President

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Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl has dwindled. Today's EU leaders want to take more decisions inter-governmentally, rather than use the supranational EC structures. That is a recipe for fewer decisions because all have to agree. Similarly, there is no coherent European view as to how to tackle the economic and social impact of globalisation. Migration will help the otherwise dire European demographic situation but itself poses problems of social cohesion, importing, as Moisi has argued, the culture of humiliation into European societies and contributing to the changed perception of the European Union in countries such as the Netherlands.

Even so, Europe will remain not just a hugely important economic player, as the largest economic grouping in the world, but a hugely important political player as the largest democratic grouping in the world as well. Far from being concerned about soft power, Europe is likely to see it as increasingly the most potent way of maintaining peace and stability in the world. The Europeans will not eschew the use of military power for peacekeeping, and will develop their independent capacity despite what President Mitterrand once described as an American desire to control more as they cared less, about Europe. However, the US nuclear umbrella and the US commitment to the defence of Europe through NATO will still be of huge importance to almost all European countries. That will not make them more inclined to support American actions like Iraq but it will be an important factor in Europe not wanting to allow its relationship with the United States to become cool or remote. By the same token, Europeans are unlikely to undertake peacekeeping operations in the face of US opposition, not least because their dependence on American equipment and logistical support will continue. While the European Union and the United States continue, in their different ways, to distort world trade and damage the interests of developing countries through agricultural subsidy and tariffs friction will continue between them as they also compete to pin the blame on each other. But there has been steady progress towards reform of agriculture on both sides of the Atlantic and the pressure on both Europe and America from other trading partners and from public opinion will compel further mutual concessions.

There has been growing cooperation between the EU and the US on the management of competition policy and business regulation. This

seems set to grow as both have an interest in establishing world-wide norms of behaviour for other industrialising countries.

Looking Eastwards?

The shifting of the tectonic plates, first observed in the 1980s as the United States started to pay less attention to Europe than in the past and more to Asia and the Far East, has continued. It may speed up as American preoccupation with commercial and political competition from China, in particular, grows. With the end of the Cold War, the trend is mirrored in Europe. Sentiment and policy will not be uniform across Europe. It will still be good domestic politics for a British Prime Minister to be seen at home to have a close relationship with the President of the United States, though Britain can afford to distance itself from particular US policies to a greater extent than in the past or than Tony Blair has recognised. It will still be good politics in France for the President to be seen as striking an independent attitude vis a vis America but this will be less marked under Chirac's successor just as the opposite tendency will be less marked under Blair's. The countries of eastern and central Europe will, albeit erratically, become more integrated within the European Union but will still look to the United States for their protection, especially if they are faced with continuing Russian bullying.

In the aftermath of the French Revolution the British establishment, terrified that the rot might spread to England, clamped down on liberal expression forcing reformers, such as William Cobbett, to flee to the United States.¹⁶ The restored French monarchy was similarly disposed. It may be that the United States has been passing through a similar period as it has had to come to terms with the shock and grief of 9/11 and that what Europe has generally seen as the measured approach of US Presidents from Eisenhower to Clinton will be restored.

Faced with terrorism on an even greater scale, or a China which was not just threatening the United States commercially, but undermining the scope for democratisation elsewhere in the world and for a world order acceptable to it, then the United States could revert to policies of "hard" power which would again put it at odds with a Europe committed to "soft" power.¹⁷ However, the present European resentment of US policies is a product of reluctant despair, not wilful rebellion against American leadership of what is still recognisably the

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West i.e. a community of interest based on democracy, defence and a belief in the benefits of liberal economies. If that is the case, those shared democratic values, defence interests and economic systems are capable of restoring a shared analysis of world developments and of being translated into agreed policies.

“Events dear boy, events” should, however, never be lost sight of.

Endnotes

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